





Merger activity is gathering pace in Europe. 2005 saw
large value mergers or acquisitions such as Italy’s
Unicredito of Germany’s HVB in the banking indus-
try and France’s Pernod Ricard of the UK’s Allied
Domecq in the food and drink sector. The pace of
activity in utilities has been especially hectic: France’s
Suez acquired Belgium’s Electrabel, France Telecom
bought Spain’s Amena and Telefónica (Spain) has
launched a bid for O2 (UK). Within Spain, Gas
Natural has also announced its intention to take over
Endesa. Private equity firms (mostly British and
American) have been active, especially in the prof-
itable restructuring of conglomerates. Not so long
ago mergers were basically an Anglo-Saxon phenom-
enon, but now they are a European phenomenon.
Cross-border mergers are an increasing proportion of
the total, and activity within the EU-15 is now the
most important component of this trend.
This reflects the long-term effects of market integra-
tion in Europe. But broader trends in the world econ-
omy are also important – the revolution in informa-
tion technology, the widening of markets through
globalisation, the strength of corporate profits and
the availability of cheap credit. Globalisation, espe-
cially in the form of competition from emerging
economies, like China and India, has induced restruc-
turing and redeployment to increase productivity, and
mergers are an integral part of such a process.
Mergers raise many public policy issues. It is not clear
that mergers always create value for either sharehold-
ers or customers. Consolidation poses a threat to
competition, the main driver of efficiency and pro-
ductivity growth, and domestic competition is the best
school for international competitiveness. Domestic
mergers are generally more threatening to competi-
tion than cross-border ones, and it may be agreed that
globalisation lessens the need for merger control. But
it is important to establish that European merger con-
trol is up to the task of ensuring that the merger wave
is beneficial to consumers as well as to investment
bankers.
Many European governments have a protectionist
instinct and view with suspicion the foreign takeover
of their national champions. They also tend to give
special attention to what are considered “strategic”
sectors, such as banking and utilities. These pressures
are particularly strong in France and Italy, as the dis-
cussion over whether French Danone could be taken
over by PepsiCo, and the obstacles put by the (former)
governor of the Bank of Italy to the foreign takeover
of Antonveneta and BNL show. France has issued a
list of strategic sectors where national interests have
to be protected (although it seems that yoghurt final-
ly has not been included in the list).1 These actions
have not, however, halted the steady rise in cross-bor-
der mergers; and, somewhat paradoxically, acquisi-
tions by French public or semipublic companies (for
example, by France Telecom and EDF) have been
particularly extensive. There are two closely related
public policy questions in this context. Does owner-
ship matter? Does Europe need either national or
European champions?
In this chapter we will look first at some of the recent
evidence on merger activity, focusing on the rationale
of mergers and evaluation of their effects. We go on
to survey the evolution of competition policy towards
mergers in Europe and the new regulation that the EU
has put in place. We will also explore the tension
between industrial policy and competition policy. 
2. Mergers and acquisitions in figures
The world has never before seen a boom of mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) on the scale of the late
1990s. According to the Thomson Financial
Securities Database, 1999 marked the peak of the
1 Mr Riboud, chairman and CEO of Danone, stated: “It is the duty
of governments and political representatives in all parts of the world
to do what they can to see that the decision-making centres of large
businesses stay in their home countries. There is nothing shocking
about that. I don’t think there was anything out of place in the way
the French government and politicians showed concern over the pos-
sibility of a hostile bid.”recent mergers and acquisitions boom with an aggre-
gate value of nearly 4,000 billion dollars. For com-
parison, in 1989 – the peak of the preceding boom in
terms of merger value – the figure reached 747 bil-
lion dollars. The peak in the number of deals was
reached in 2000 when more than 37,000 were report-
ed (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). The magnitude of the
recent boom means that the rising trend evident in
Figure 5.1 disguises the tendency for mergers to
occur in waves: the scale of activity at the end of the
1990s dwarfs the peak of ten years before, itself a
substantial increase on previous levels. However, the
last century has seen merger waves – one at the
beginning of the century and then at the end of the
1920s, 1960s, 1980s and 1990s. 
Until the 1980s, most M&A activity was undertaken
by American and British firms. But during the latest
wave, mergers and acquisitions also played an in-
creasing role in other industrialised countries, espe-
cially in continental Europe.
This can (in part) be attributed
to the introduction of the Single
Market in 1993, but also to the
fall of the Iron Curtain and the
intensified competition from
low-wage countries.
The decline in value since 2000
is more accentuated than the
decline in the number of deals
makes clear. This indicates the
extent to which the recent boom
featured so-called mega-deals,
defined as transactions with a
value of more than one billion
dollars. According to the World
Investment Report 2004 these transactions made up
40 percent of the entire cross-border M&A value in
1987, whereas its share rose to 75 percent in 2000.
Prominent examples of such mega-deals have been
mentioned in the introduction. Other examples
include the purchase of Italy’s Banca Antonveneta
by the Dutch ABN Amro and the German deal
between Viterra and Deutsche Annington Im-
mobilien (IBO).
As the number of international transactions demon-
strates, cross-border M&A has gained importance and
contributed more than proportionately to the increase
in overall merger value. In 1986, 17.6 percent of all
M&A value was incorporated in cross-border trans-
actions, the share rose to 39.9 percent in 1990 and to
37.2 percent in 2001.2 Figure 5.3 shows that cross-bor-
der activity was especially vigorous in EU-15 coun-
tries. The exceptional size of the 1999–2000 boom is
almost entirely accounted for by this explosion in
activity within the EU. US com-
panies were also major players in
mergers and acquisitions, but the
cyclical upswing there was much
less pronounced, as was also true
in Japan (where the scale of
M&A activity is much smaller).
Within Europe, the United King-
dom has always been the most
active purchaser of foreign firms,
as shown in the lower part of





2 According to the Thomson Financial
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purchases rising from a value of 21.8 billion dollars in
1990 to 168.7 billion dollars in 2000. In 2005, France
even became the leading player with an aggregate deal
value of 59.5 billion dollars (see Table 5.1). German
companies only started to purchase foreign firms in
the recent merger wave: 1999 was the peak year so far
with an aggregated deal value of 85.5 billion dollars.
The Netherlands and Spain are the next largest
acquirers.
The growth of European merger
activity means that the US is now
a net seller of firms and Europe a
net buyer: in 2000, European
firms were sold, to the value of
$587 billion, but purchases by
European firms totalled $802 bil-
lion. The equivalent figures for
the United States are $324 billion
and $159 billion respectively.3
China basically only plays a role
as a target region of M&A. In
2001, M&A sales reached a local
peak of 10.6 billion dollars. The
purchases, however, peaked in
2001 with only 1.6 billion dol-
lars. Surprisingly for its size,
Japan literally does not partici-
pate in international cross-bor-
der merger activity. Even in the
boom year 2000 Japanese com-
panies undertook M&A deals of
“only” 20.8 billion dollars. For
comparison, the US reached a
value of 159 billion and the UK
one of 382 billion dollars.4
The new EU member states can
be neglected as purchasers, but
they are important as a target region. In these coun-
tries merger activity increased from literally zero in
1989 to a total value of about 18 billion dollars in
2001.5 Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic are
the major target countries, with a combined deal
value of almost 13 billion dollars in 2001, while the
entire group of new members reached a level of
14.7 billion dollars. This makes up 88 percent of all
cross-border M&A sales in these
three countries. The development
was almost entirely driven by for-
eign investors, especially in the
eight Eastern European states
which became recipients of flows
of foreign capital after the Iron
Curtain was lifted. In 1990,
100 percent of all merger value
Figure 5.3
Table 5.1 
European cross-border M&A (1 Jan.–15 Aug. 2005)
Country of acquirer Deal value (bn. $) Number of deals
France 59.5  146 
United States 55.6  398 
Italy 27.9  76 
Britain 19.8  272 
Spain 18  53 
Sweden 15.7  136 
Switzerland 11.7  70 
Germany 7.4  164 
Denmark 6.6  91 
Saudi Arabia 6.6  2 
Total 286.6  2251 
Source: The Economist, 3 September, 2005, Dealogic.
3 According to UNCTAD (2005).
4 UNCTAD Cross-Border M&A Data-
base (2005). The figure for the UK is ex-
ceptionally high for the year 2000 due to
the takeover of Mannesmann by Voda-
fone. The deal itself comprised 202.8 bil-
lion dollars.
5 These figures are from the Thomson
Financial Securities Database.there was classified as cross-border activity. There-
after, this share decreased to 64 percent in 2003. How-
ever, the trend pointed upwards again in 2004. The
share of cross-border M&A is still at a very high level
compared to more developed economies.
Hostile activity has declined since the 1980s. In 1985,
about 30 percent of the value (although a much small-
er proportion of the number) of acquisitions were
hostile,6 and this figure was even close to 50 percent
within the EU-15; the share of contested bids had fall-
en to 8 percent in 2004 (there is a spike in 1999 due to
the takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone for
$202.8 billion, a deal so large that it significantly dis-
torts all figures for that year7 (see Figure 5.4).
Among cross-border transactions, Evenett (2003)
points out that the service sector has played a more
prominent role in M&A activity in recent years. While
in 1990 about 62 percent of the value of mergers was
in the manufacturing sector (with only 35 percent in
the tertiary sector), this ratio was reversed ten years
later. In the recent wave, the proportion of horizontal
mergers has increased: Andrade et al. (2001) report
that nearly 50 percent of all mergers in the US take
place between firms from the same industry. But the
industries within which such
activity has been concentrated
have changed substantially over
time, as Table 5.2 illustrates.8
Although the recent trend of
M&A underlines the increased
global perspective of firms by
both a higher value of mergers
and a wider participation of
countries, M&A activity is still
concentrated in a few regions.
The US and the UK are still
major players if one looks at total
value of M&A deals. However,
continental European countries
have caught up in recent years
and even outperformed the US and the UK in cross-
border M&A recently (see Table 5.1). 
3. The rationale for mergers
Globalisation is associated with technological
change (particularly in information technology),
with decreases in trade and transport costs (in goods,
capital, people and information), and with liberali-
sation and market integration, which simultaneously
enlarge the market and increase competitive pres-
sure. Productive systems require revision to accom-
modate these changes. In many sectors the number
of firms will have to be reduced in an integrated or
enlarged market in order to reap economies of scale.
In many industries, in particular in those subject to
network externalities and learning curves, activities
that demand or give advantage to scale, such as
investment in R&D, innovation and securing a large
customer base, become central to competitive strate-
gy. Mergers are a prime instrument of industrial re-
structuring.
For example, in banking there is a move from the tra-
ditional business of taking deposits and granting
loans to the provision of services
to investors (investment funds,





Top five industries based on average annual merger activity (US)
1970s 1980s 1990s
Metal mining Oil & gas Metal mining
Real estate Textile Media & telecom.
Oil & gas Misc. manufacturing  Banking 
Apparel  Non-depository credit  Real estate
Machinery Food  Hotels
Source: Andrade et al. (2001).
6 A merger is classified as hostile if there is
resistance to the takeover on the part of
the target company’s board of directors
and management.
7 UNCTAD and Thomson Financial count
this merger in different years.
8 Further evidence is provided by Mitchell
and Mulherin (1996) and Andrade and
Stafford (1999).EEAG Report 105
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firms (consulting, insurance, advice and preparation
of M&A, underwriting of equity and debt issues, and
risk management). As a source of revenue, the mar-
gin – that is the difference between borrowing and
lending rates – makes way for fees and commissions,
and investment in “bricks and mortar”(the branches)
to investment in communication networks, informa-
tion technology, and highly specialised human capi-
tal.9 This change may mean that size is important,
especially in wholesale and investment banking. The
outcome of this process is an overhaul of the bank-
ing sector that, in general, is more advanced in the
US than in Europe. 
Merger and acquisition activity may enhance profits
by improving the efficiency of firms or increasing
their market power. Firms may merge to obtain syn-
ergies, exploit scale economies and rationalise pro-
duction, or to reduce managerial inefficiency by tak-
ing over a poorly run firm. If capital markets are
imperfect, it may pay also to merge to gain financial
muscle and to diversify to undertake major and/or
risky investments. This may apply in particular to
important R&D projects. But a horizontal merger
may also increase the market power of the merging
firms, enabling them to raise prices. A vertical merger
may have efficiency benefits. It may eliminate the
“double margin” which arises when two successive
firms in the chain of production each have market
power: it may also enable complementary assets to be
brought under single control. Vertical mergers may,
however, also raise rivals’ costs or foreclose a com-
petitor. This may be the case, for example, if the
merged entity controls some essential input for down-
stream suppliers. 
There may also be other motives for merger that need
not increase profits or enhance shareholder value.
These result from the ambitions of managers and
inefficiencies in the relationship between them and the
owners of the firm. Managers may seek higher status
by promoting size rather than profitability, may pro-
tect their private benefits of control with entrench-
ment strategies, and may engage in empire building.
Size may lead to inefficiency as management becomes
bureaucratic and the loss of control by owners leads
to agency problems. A typical defensive strategy to
keep a firm independent is to engage in unprofitable
mergers to increase firm size and make a takeover by
another company less likely. Mergers may be the con-
sequence of hubris: managers are overconfident and
assess the potential value of a merger incorrectly, thus
undertaking unprofitable mergers (Roll 1986).10
Regulation, and the relationship between economics
and political structures, may also provide a motive
for merger. A large firm may be “too big to fail”; this
is typical of the banking business but applies to other
industries as well. It may have a larger capacity to
influence regulation or more capacity to obtain sub-
sidies through lobbying and political connections.
For international firms, size may be important to
obtain government protection of their interests
abroad. These arguments will tend to have more
weight for domestic mergers than for cross-border
mergers.
Almost all these reasons for mergers – good and bad
from the perspective of shareholders, desirable and
undesirable from the perspective of public policy – can
be seen in the banking industry. Size offers the possi-
bility of exploiting scale economies in administrative
and back-office operations, information technology,
and in investment banking type operations (related to
information gathering and fund management). Size
may help in realising scope economies (through com-
bining different product lines because, for instance, it
increases the value of customer relationships and
decreases average marketing costs). Consolidation may
deliver these advantages, eliminating excess capacity in
the branch network when the networks of the merging
banks overlap, and improving diversification, particu-
larly if the banks operate in regions with non-synchro-
nised cycles. Furthermore, consolidation may provide
a way to cut excess labour and to access the mass retail
market in a foreign country. 
As we have seen, mergers tend to happen in waves.
Only recently have theoretical models attempted to
account for this phenomenon. The explanations in-
volve the exploitation of market inefficiencies
(Shleifer and Vishny 2003, Rhodes-Kropf and
Viswanathan 2004), the desire of managers to pre-
serve their independence (Gorton et al. 2005), cycli-
cal phenomena (Lambrecht 2004), strategic consid-
erations (Faulí-Oller 2000 and Toxvaerd 2004) or
capital reallocation due to technological shocks
(Jovanovic and Rousseau 2002, 2003). Although all
these factors may help explain merger waves, the
argument based on technological shocks seems the
most compelling. The different theoretical models
are described in Box 5.1.
9 However, we should expect that banks will maintain a liquidity
insurance provision role.  10 See also the survey article on mergers by Mueller (2003).What are the consequences for concentration?
Globalisation and market integration imply effective
enlargement of the market, which has consequences
for the equilibrium level of concentration in a market.
In an industry characterised by the presence of a fixed
and sunk cost of entry, concentration decreases as the
ratio of the market size to the sunk cost of entry
increases. For example, when markets with the same
number of firms become integrated, the total number
of firms in the free entry equilibrium falls, but to a
number which is larger than the initial number of
firms in either of the original markets. Concentration
in the integrated market is thus lower than in any of
the original markets. However, in industries in which
the sunk cost is endogenous – that is controlled by the
firm, as in investment in R&D or in advertising or
other expenditures not related to output but designed
to reduce costs, boost demand, or to improve the
quality of the services offered – an increase in market
size need not lower concentration (Sutton 1991). For




Why mergers happen in waves
Exploitation of market inefficiencies. In Shleifer and Vishny (2003), stock-financed mergers are driven by relative market
valuations of merging firms. Stock market inefficiencies lead to misvaluation. Rational managers exploit these inefficiencies,
in part through mergers, and takeovers are more likely when misvaluations are high.
In a similar vein Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) construct a rational model of stock mergers with false market valua-
tions. While managers of the bidder have private information about both the stand-alone value of their own firm and the
potential value of the merged firms, target firms’ managers are only aware of the stand-alone value of their firm. To assess
the synergies, they have to rely on market valuation through the bids they receive. This is the crucial mechanism of the model
that generates merger waves. Since there is a market-wide and a firm-specific effect of the misvaluation, the target tries to
filter out the market-wide effect. When the market-wide overvaluation is high, the estimation error of the synergy is also high. 
Hence, bids appear much more attractive in overvalued than undervalued markets. Empirical evidence for the impact of stock
market valuation on M&A activity can be found in Ang and Cheng (2003), Dong et al. (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf et al.
(2005).
Manager independence. Gorton et al. (2005) explain merger waves by the managerial interest in keeping the firm independ-
ent. Since larger size decreases the probability of acquisition by another firm, protection against mergers may be pursued at
the expense of profitability, and a potentially efficient merger within one industry may result in a merger wave with unprofit-
able mergers. The first merger sets off a chain reaction; as the authors put it, the defensive actions of all companies result in a
“race for firm size”.
Cyclical phenomena. Lambrecht (2004) provides a model to explain why mergers occur more frequently in times of eco-
nomic expansion than recession. Takeovers promise the exploitation of scale economies, which are correlated with the market
demand for the firm’s product and hence its market price. Given that mergers always involve costs, transactions become more
likely if product prices, and hence the benefits of the merger, rise. Consequently, product markets that show cyclical behav-
iour are more likely to be subject to merger waves.
Strategic considerations. Toxvaerd (2004) considers a finite number of acquiring firms competing for a scarce number of
target firms. Each acquiring firm can either undertake the transaction immediately or wait for better market conditions. This, 
however, involves the risk of being pre-empted by competitors. The author shows that, in equilibrium, acquirers undertake their
transactions simultaneously, thus generating merger waves. The intuition for this result is that while waiting to merge is only
optimal when other firms wait as well, there is a risk of not finding a target firm to acquire when other companies have already 
acted. Thus,a merger wave is anticipated and all firms buy their predetermined target atthe same time.
Non-strategic and strategic considerations. Faulí-Oller (2000), in a Cournot model with cost asymmetries, combines both
non-strategic and strategic explanations for merger waves. The former comprise exogenous determinants that make takeovers
profitable. The latter include interrelations among firms making mergers profitable only if other firms merge as well. The
author shows that an exogenous reduction in demand stimulates merger activity as cost asymmetries are thereby accentuated
and mergers become more profitable. The strategic effect is that non-participating firms create a negative effect on the merger
since they respond to it by increasing their output. The fewer competitors there are, the less intense is this effect. Under
certain circumstances, an initial merger can thereby make further mergers more attractive.
a)
Capital reallocation due to technological shocks. According to the theory of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2004), merger waves
coincide with epochs of technological change, for example the spread of electricity in the period 1890-1930 or of information
technology between 1970 and 2002. Technological progress forces firms to restructure and make their production process
more efficient. As some firms do better than others, technological change naturally generates a higher dispersion between the
efficiency of different firms. The analysis relies on Tobin’s q as a measure of the market’s evaluation of the relative effi-
ciency of a firm. Following this reasoning, a technological shock increases the q for successful firms and lowers it for less 
successful ones. Hence, high-q firms will purchase low-q firms and thus ensure a better allocation of capital. Using US stock
market data, this straightforward theory provides a reasonable fit for four out of five merger waves that occurred in the twen-
tieth century.
b)Mergers and acquisitions have become a much more important device for capital allocation relative to ordinary
entry and exit of firms in the market. 
a) Faulí-Oller explains merger activity by a reduction in demand (in declining industries and refers to Dutz 1989 for examples), while Lam-
brecht (2004) points out that merger activity is positively related with booms (like the last wave which peaked in 2000). There need to be no
contradiction since an overall merger wave can rather be explained by Lambrecht’s view, whereas it may be true that there is some need for
restructuring in declining branches (which would probably be too small to create a merger wave).
b) In an earlier study Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) demonstrate that there is a clear empirical relationship between the reallocation of capital
via M&A and the dispersion of q among companies. It is shown that the response of investment through M&A to a change in the dispersion of
q is 2.6 times higher than the response of regular investment.EEAG Report 107
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network is a fixed and sunk cost, and the transforma-
tion of banking towards a service industry may
increase the sunk cost required from the bank through
its investment in communication networks/infor-
mation technology or specialised human capital. We
might envision competition proceeding in three
stages: (1) entry decisions which demand certain
expenditure to be present in a market at all; (2) invest-
ment decisions which imply fixed costs, as in R&D,
advertising, and information technology; and (3) fol-
lowing these preparatory expenditures, competition in
the marketplace. Under these conditions increasing
the size of the market does not generate more entry in
equilibrium, in fact it may generate exit, because com-
petition at the investment stage is very fierce. The
required circumstances are that the fixed expenditure
in (2) must loom large in relation to the variable one
at the production and market stage and that the mar-
ket share must be sufficiently sensitive to the invest-
ment effort. A larger market leads only to increased
expenditures by a few firms and there is typically an
upper bound to the number of active firms in the mar-
ket (no matter how large that market) and we may
speak of a natural oligopoly (see Sutton 1991 and
Schmalensee 1992).
It is an empirical question to what degree sunk costs
in a particular industry are “endogenous” in the
sense described above. It is likely, however, that the
increased importance of investment in information
technology, in information acquisition, in building a
customer base in markets with network externalities
and/or learning curves has increased the importance
of endogenous sunk costs. This means that fixed
expenditures are now larger relative to variable ones,
and that the market share has increased its sensitivi-
ty to investment in fixed costs. If this is so, then it
may be true that in some industries in the global
market place there is only room for a few players. In
financial services this might apply to wholesale and
investment banking (providing services – underwrit-
ing, trading, brokerage, rating, and advice and pre-
paration of M&A – to the top tier of multinational




A merger will affect the profits of the merged entity
(the insiders), its rivals (outsiders) and will influence
the prices, quality and variety of products available to
consumers. Welfare assessment of a merger is thus
complex. When mergers increase the profits of the
merging firms, there are generally potentially two
opposing effects: welfare losses from a reduction in
effective competition and welfare gains from scale
economies and unit cost reductions. Increased con-
centration will tend to enhance welfare overall only if
the merged firm gains market share through lower
prices.
In the absence of cost reduction effects, a merger that
is profitable for insiders tends to be profitable for out-
siders also because it tends to raise price and restrict
output. Consumers are typically hurt. If firms are
symmetric – that is of similar sizes – then the effect is
a reduction in total welfare (the sum of producer and
consumer surplus). However, if firms are asymmetric,
then a merger of small firms may improve productive
efficiency (by making the capacities of the firms in the
market more equal and shifting production from
high-cost to low-cost firms) and profits so much that
total welfare may rise even though prices and concen-
tration increase.11
In a study of mergers around the world based on the
global Thomson Financial Securities Database for the
period 1981 to 1998 (which covers all transactions of
at least 1 million dollars in size), Gugler et al. (2003)
found that on average mergers do increase profits but
reduce sales of the merging firms. The authors did not
find large differences between geographic areas, man-
ufacturing or services, or between domestic and cross-
border operations. Conglomerate mergers decrease
sales more than horizontal mergers. 
The authors differentiate four categories of merger:
Market power effects (27.6 percent) is when sales are
reduced and profits increase. Efficiency improve-
ment (29.0 percent) occurs when both sales and
profits rise. Efficiency decline (28.2 percent) is where
both sales and profits fall, while a fourth category
involving higher sales but lower profits (15.1 per-
cent) may be explained by the pursuit of size at the
expense of profits. The study reveals a rich variety
11 In fact, under some technical conditions on the profit functions
under quantity (Cournot) competition, a merger with a small initial
joint market share of the insiders, which is profitable and increases
price, also raises the total surplus (Farrell and Shapiro 1990). With
product differentiation, the average share-weighted price may fall
post merger if there is a significant shift in output towards non-merg-
ing lower-cost firms. If a merger generates synergies, then (under
some technical conditions on the profit functions) under quantity
(Cournot) competition with homogenous product or price (Bertrand)
competition with differentiated products, a merger will benefit con-
sumers if and only if it hurts competitors (see Farrell and Shapiro
1990 and Vives 1999). of outcomes consistent with a similar variety of
motives for merger. 
Before concluding that a majority of mergers in the
15-year period examined were welfare-reducing, as
the authors do, a full welfare analysis should consider
effects on rivals and consumers. Pesendorfer (2003)
does this for horizontal mergers in the US paper
industry in the mid-1980s. He found that both effi-
ciency and welfare increased after this industry-spe-
cific M&A wave. Merged firms reduced capacity and
generally lost market shares with an overall positive
welfare effect as a result since the mergers increased
producer surplus without affecting consumer surplus.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) provide empirical evi-
dence that the majority of firm asset transactions gen-
erate productivity gains and better allocative efficien-
cy in a sample of around ten thousand transactions.
Using data from the Longitudinal Research Database
(LRD) of the US Bureau of the Census for the years
1974 to 1992, the authors calculate total factor pro-
ductivity and compare that measure at the firm level
one year before a transaction with two years after.
The mean industry-adjusted change in productivity is
significantly positive with a 2 percent increase.
During the 1990s, many national and cross-border
mergers took place in the banking sector, comple-
mented by strategic alliances and joint ventures that
led to a consolidation of the industry. Evenett (2003)
seeks to distinguish efficiency and market power
effects by analysis of the interest rate spread (the dif-
ference between the average interest rate paid by bor-
rowers and the average interest rate the bank pays to
depositors). An increase in the interest rate spread
indicates that banks gained more market power and
did not pass lower costs due to efficiency gains onto
customers. Using data from the World Bank and the
Bank for International Settlements, Evenett finds
mixed results. Cross-border strategic alliances within
the EU seemed to be associated with an increase in
the interest rate spread, whereas intra-EU cross-bor-
der mergers reduced this spread. Outside the EU,
both strategic alliances and M&A have decreased
interest rate spreads, pointing to positive welfare
effects.
Another interesting stylised fact is that mergers
between asymmetric firms (for example, a large and a
small firm) tend to fare better than those among more
symmetric firms (see Capron 1999 and Conn et al.
2003).
4.2 Winners and losers
Andrade et al. (2001) seek to identify winners and
losers of M&A between publicly traded US firms in
the period 1973–1998.12 The impact of mergers on
stock prices is analysed by employing short-window
event studies that monitor stock market reactions one
day before the announcement of the merger to one
day after. In a second step, this window is also extend-
ed to 20 days prior to the announcement to the com-
pletion of the merger. The basic result is that owners
of target firms’ stock clearly benefit from the merger.
The value creation amounts to 16 percent, on average.
On the other hand, the impact of the merger on stock
owners of the acquiring company is not clear cut (on
average, stock value is reduced by 0.7 percent; howev-
er, this result is insignificant). Combining both the
target and acquiring firm effect, stockholders on aver-
age gained 2.6 percent in the 1980s and 1.4 percent in
the 1990s. 
If markets are sufficiently well informed about the
effects of the merger, these increases in value would
reflect the anticipated returns. However, the high
degree of uncertainty about estimates of expected
returns incorporated in stock prices must be translat-
ed into a similarly high degree of uncertainty in the
estimation of abnormal returns.
The empirical evidence for an important fraction of
mergers seems to be inconsistent. For those mergers,
event studies find that the stock market value of the
merged firms increases, while profits decline. This
leaves three puzzles: (1) Why do unprofitable mergers
occur?; (2) How can the value of the merged firms
increase while profits decrease?; and (3) Why do firms
acquire other firms if the gain is almost wholly
derived by stockholders of the target company?
Fridolfsson and Stennek (2001) try to resolve the puz-
zles by proposing a single explanation. In a coalition
bargaining model, the authors show that pre-emptive
mergers are rational if it is disadvantageous to be-
come an outsider, that is to be excluded from the
merger wave. The negative externality imposed on
non-participating firms creates an incentive to engage
in pre-emptive mergers. Although the merger results
in lower profits, the value might increase since the pre-
merger stock value takes into account the risk of
becoming an outsider, an even worse result for profits,
which is thereby averted.
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ing information for all firms listed in the New York Stock Exchange,
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4.3 Mergers and R&D
The dynamic consequences of mergers on innovation
are among the most important effects. Innovation is
the engine of growth and it may well be that a (nega-
tive) static welfare effect is overturned by a (positive)
dynamic merger-induced efficiency effect or vice
versa. Mergers might have scope and scale effects in
R&D, generating sharper incentives to engage in that
activity (for example, a firm producing a larger output
will have more incentive to invest in cost reduction, as
in Vives 2004). Also, positive spillover effects vis-à-vis
related firms can be internalised, bringing social and
private returns more closely in line. Mergers may also
provide a firm with more financial resources and this
may allow it to undertake riskier and more ambitious
R&D projects in the presence of capital market
imperfections. At the same time, mergers may avoid
the duplication of effort and, in fact, reduce R&D
effort while maintaining R&D output. On the other
hand, mergers may soften competition, and the
empirical literature as well as some theoretical models
have concluded that a degree of competition is need-
ed for innovation to occur and that competitive pres-
sure tends to foster innovation (see Baily and
Gersbach 1995, Nickell 1996, Aghion et al. 2005 and
Vives 2004).
The strength and net impact of these effects is an
unresolved empirical question. The evidence available
on the R&D performance of mergers is fragmentary
and mixed. Note, however, that a result that indicates
that R&D effort is reduced by mergers could be com-
patible with welfare-enhancing operations, since the
elimination of duplication efforts may be good. 
Several studies focus on the effect of mergers on R&D
investment. In a study for the biotech and pharma-
ceutical industries, Danzon et al. (2004) show that
large firms in this sector often merge to eliminate
overcapacity, which may emerge on the expiry of
patents. Controlling for the propensity to merge, the
authors find that there is no difference between R&D
expenses of merged firms compared to similar firms
in the same industry that did not merge. Smaller firms
in this industry often see mergers as an exit strategy
when under financial pressure. 
Cassiman et al. (2004) argue that technological and
market relatedness should determine the impact of a
merger on the level of R&D. Firms that use comple-
mentary technologies should increase their joint level
of R&D after merger, whereas firms with substitutive
technologies might be expected to reduce it.
Aggregation of product market activities can yield
economies of scale and scope with indirect conse-
quences for R&D expenditures. In a small sample of
31 EU mergers, Cassiman et al. (2004) find that R&D
levels rise where technologies are complementary and
fall when they are substitutive. Where technologies are
substitutive, R&D reductions are larger where firms
are product market rivals. Overall the authors find
empirical evidence for the scope effect, whereas the
scale effect does not appear in the data.
The semiconductor industry ranks high in R&D
spending (amounting to 13 percent of sales). Gugler
and Siebert (2004) looked at efficiency versus market
power effects in this industry and compared mergers
with research joint ventures (RJV). RJVs should also
be capable of internalising positive spillover effects
yielding a higher R&D level. Indeed, Gugler and
Siebert (2004) find that RJVs generate higher welfare
gains since the market power effect, which could
potentially decrease the efficiency gain effect, is less-
ened. Hence, from a public policy perspective, such
RJVs offer the advantage of not reducing competition
on the product market. 
4.4 Summary
The assessment of the performance of mergers is
complex and there is evidence consistent with differ-
ent explanations of their origin. On balance, however,
the most plausible explanation is that mergers
respond to technological shocks and are an instru-
ment of restructuring, and this explains merger waves.
Other motives are superimposed on this central influ-
ence of technology: to gain market power, to benefit
managers or managerial overconfidence. These latter
factors explain why merger waves may overshoot and
some mergers may destroy value.
5. Competition policy and merger control
Competition policy has as its main goal the protection
of social welfare by maintaining a healthy competitive
process. There is a debate over whether competition
policy should be directed only to the consumer inter-
est (that is consumer surplus) or should encompass
also profit or producer surplus (often described as a
total surplus standard). In any case, competition pol-
icy is today directed towards economic efficiency. In
the US, it took some time to get to this point, over-
coming populist attitudes according to which meresize was an offence. Now only market power is. In
Europe, the efficiency objective has been intertwined
with other goals like the promotion of small and
medium-sized firms, innovation and the external com-
petitiveness of European firms. An added objective
has been to promote European economic integration.
Unique among competition policy authorities, the
European Commission has the duty of monitoring
industrial rationalisation programmes and state aid to
industry. All in all, however, the efficiency objective
has gained weight. 
The foundation for competition policy is that com-
petitive pressure is the guiding force towards econom-
ic efficiency. There are general arguments in favour of
competition that, in principle, apply to any industry.
Indeed, the benefits of competition for allocative effi-
ciency are well established since Adam Smith. It must
be noted, however, that competition is in general
imperfect because of entry barriers, switching costs,
product differentiation and asymmetric information.
The result is that there is room for firms to exercise
market power. A consequence is that the welfare the-
orems associated with perfect competition are not
directly applicable to any real industry. All in all, how-
ever, competition is perceived to be good for both
allocative and productive efficiency. The pressure of a
competitive market provides incentives to managers
to perform and information to design appropriate
incentive schemes.13 Monopoly power induces ineffi-
ciency and waste, and a healthy degree of rivalry is
necessary to keep a vigorous pace of innovation in an
industry, that is, for dynamic efficiency.
Competition policy tries to prevent adverse conse-
quences of market power by controlling ex post res-
trictive practices (like price-fixing or market-sharing
arrangements in cartels) and abusive practices (like
attempts to monopolise or exclude rivals from the
market). It also seeks to control merger activity ex
ante: preserving market structures conducive to com-
petition or preventing market structures that pre-
clude effective competition. Merger control tries
therefore to anticipate the consequences for competi-
tion of the restructuring induced by a merger. Merger
analysis distinguishes between the “unilateral effects”
and the “coordinated effects” of a merger. The uni-
lateral effects reflect the consequences of raising
prices above costs and are measured with the stan-
dard oligopoly-pricing static models of competition
among the few. Coordinated effects arise when firms
agree explicitly, or implicitly via reward and punish-
ment strategies, to keep prices high. Coordinated
effects reflect actual or tacit collusion. An analysis of
entry conditions, potential efficiency gains, and
dynamic effects (on investment and innovation for
example) is also relevant. 
The procedure in the US and the EU is similar. It
starts by defining the relevant (geographic and prod-
uct) market and proceeds to compute market share
and concentration indicators (like the Herfindahl
index).14 Those are used to define safe harbours, basi-
cally stating that mergers with small combined market
shares should be allowed to proceed, in particular in
unconcentrated industries. There is a major difference
between the EU and the US. In the EU, the jurisdic-
tion that should deal with the merger must be estab-
lished: the European Commission or a national
authority.15 The allocation of jurisdiction may be con-
tentious as the recent Spanish Gas Natural–Endesa
case shows, with the Commission taking more than
two months to decide.
The definition of the relevant market, in product or
geographic space, is crucial and typically contentious.
For example, in the blocked proposed merger of the
two Swedish truck manufacturers, Volvo and Scania,
the European Commission concluded that each of the
individual countries (such as Sweden, Denmark,
Norway, Finland, and Ireland) was a market within
which the merged company could exercise excessive
market power. However, the merging parties argued in
favour of the European market being the relevant one
(the European Economic Area). If the relevant mar-
ket had a European rather than a national dimension,
the decision would have been different. This case
makes clear that companies that seek to gain size to
compete internationally may be prevented from merg-
ing if this is considered to raise concentration too
much in a national market. 
A rise of concentration due to the merger must then
be checked against a specific analysis of unilateral
and coordinated effects and entry conditions. To
check for unilateral effects, quantitative and simula-
tion techniques, based on oligopoly models, are
increasingly used. The analysis of coordinated effects
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13 See, for example, Hart (1983), Schaferstein (1988), Hermalin
(1990), Schmidt (1997) and Vives (2000).
14 The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the squares of the
market shares of firms in a particular market (see Chapter 4 in Vives
1999).
15 The EC will have authority over concentrations having a “Com-
munity dimension”, that is of operations with combined annual tur-
nover larger than 5 billion euros or EU-wide turnover of each of at
least two of the firms larger than 250 million euros. If each of the
firms involved has more than 2/3 of its EU-wide sales in one mem-
ber state, then this country has jurisdiction.EEAG Report 111
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is more qualitative, relying on market structure condi-
tions (like market transparency, asset distribution in
the industry in terms of capacities of production and
product portfolios of the firms, concentration and
number of firms, multi-market contact, asymmetries
in cost and demand, entry conditions and buyer
power) and facilitating practices (like a history of co-
operation in the industry, communication of plans,
exchange of information on prices and quantities, and
pricing policies) that may impinge on the capacity of
firms to collude in sustaining prices above a competi-
tive level.
In the US and the UK, a merger would be challenged
if it “substantially lessens competition”. The substan-
tive test in the EU under the old merger regulation
(from 1989) was that: “A concentration which does
not create or strengthen a dominant position as a
result of which competition would be significantly
impeded in the common market ... shall be declared
compatible with the common market.”This is a “two-
prong”test referring to the “creation or strengthening
of a dominant position”and checking whether “com-
petition is significantly impeded”. The problem was
that this test is not well adapted to deal with unilater-
al effects because a merger may raise prices and
diminish welfare even though no dominant position
for a single firm is created. The Commission then
tried to block mergers because they would create a
collective dominant position (that is foster collusion)
when in fact what potentially was at stake were uni-
lateral effects (that is non-collusive exercise of market
power), which could not be challenged using the old
regulation. An example is provided by the blocking in
1999 of the merger of Airtours and First Choice,
because it would have created a collective, dominant
position in UK short-haul foreign package holidays.
However, in 2002 the Court of First Instance (CFI)
concluded that the Commission had made errors of
assessment and had not proved to the requisite legal
standard that the merger would give rise to collective
dominance (that is the collusive potential according
to the coordinated effects analysis).
Under the old merger regulation, there was a period of
vigorous intervention at the end of the 1990s.
Prohibited or abandoned transactions tripled from an
average of two per year in 1990–98 to an average of six
per year in 1999–2000. From 1998 onwards there was
also an increase in transactions subject to structural
remedies. However, about half of the prohibition deci-
sions of the Commission have been challenged by noti-
fying parties, including, for example, Gencor/Lonrho,
Airtours/First Choice, Worldcom/MCI Sprint and
GE/Honeywell, and in 2002 the CFI overturned the
Commission’s decision in Airtours/First Choice (as dis-
cussed above), Schneider-Legrand and Tetra Laval
Sidel (see Table 5.3).
Duso, Neven and Röller (2003) have claimed that a
stock-market event study can in principle detect the
welfare impact of mergers. The authors reached their
Table 5.3 
M&As formally blocked by EU
Year Deal
1991  Aerospatiale/Alenia bid for de Havilland (Canada)
1994  Bertelsmann, Kirch, Deutsche Telecom MSG deal (digital pay TV)
1995  Dutch Holland Media Group venture between RTL4, Veronica and Endemol
1995  Nordic satellite distribution joint venture between Norsk Telecom, TeleDanmark and Kinnevik
1996  Saint-Gobain and Wacker-Chemie silicon carbide joint venture
1996  Finnish retail deal between Kesko and Tuko 
1997  Blokker’s acquisition of Dutch operations of Toys’R’Us
1998  Proposed digital TV alliance of CLT-UFA and Kirch
1998  Acquisition by Deutsche Telecom and CLT-UFA of stake in Kirch’s BetaResearch (decoders for pay TV)
1999  Airtours’ bid for tour operator First Choice (travel agencies), (turned down by CFI, 2002)
2000  MCI Worldcom & Sprint/USA (internet access)
2000  Volvo and Scania (cars and trucks)
2001  GE – Honeywell (appeal pending to CFI)
2001  Scheider – Legrand in electrical equipment (turned down by CFI, 2002)
2001  SCA-Mölnlycke & Metsä Tissue (paper)
2001  CVC and Lenzing (synthetic fiber)
2001  Tetra Laval and Sidel (drink packaging), (turned down by CFI, 2002)
2004 ENI –EDP –GDP (energy)
Source: European Commission.conclusions based on the stated insight that in some
mainstream oligopoly models with substitute prod-
ucts,16 consumer surplus increases if the profits of
outsider firms, that is firms that are not involved in
the horizontal merger, decline. A merger is pro-com-
petitive if and only if it decreases the value of rivals.
It must be noted, however, that this only applies to
horizontal mergers, and several of the mergers con-
sidered have either vertical or complementary market
components. Furthermore, a decline in the stock mar-
ket valuation of rivals as an outcome of the merger
announcement may also come about if the market
anticipates predation and exclusionary strategies
against outsiders.
In 2004 the Commission introduced a new merger reg-
ulation with a reformed substantive test, a strength-
ening of the parties’ procedural rights, and internal
controls and investigative powers of the Commission.
The procedure in the EU differs from that in the US,
which is of an adversarial nature: antitrust agencies
must challenge a merger in court. In the EU the pro-
cedure is administrative: a merger of a European
dimension has to be notified to the Directorate
General of Competition, which examines it and
makes a recommendation after which the Council of
Commissioners takes the final decision on approval.
The new procedure in the EU adds check and bal-
ances and establishes the appointment of a Chief
Competition Economist to enhance economic analy-
sis and the creation of a Scrutiny Panel, which will
review cases that go over a second phase of investiga-
tion and report to the Director General.17
The new merger regulation of 2004 introduces a new
substantive test to assess the anticompetitive impact
of concentration: “A concentration which would not
significantly impede effective competition on the
common market … shall be declared compatible
with the common market.” In this Significant
Impediment of Effective Competition (SIEC) test,
the first prong of the old regulation test, “... which
does not create or strengthen a dominant position
...”, is disposed of and only the part “effective com-
petition is significantly impeded”is kept. This makes
the test closer to the US and UK practice and allows
the Commission to deal with market power issues in
non-collusive oligopolies. At the same time the
Commission has issued horizontal merger guidelines
in the style of the US guidelines. In those guidelines,
also potential efficiencies of a merger are considered
as long as they are beneficial to consumers, merger-
specific, and verifiable. 
When the antitrust agency in the US – be it the
Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commis-
sion – decides to challenge a merger, the parties may
decide not to pursue the transaction, given that the
judicial process may drag on for quite some time. The
new substantive test in the EU is closer to economic
analysis and less rigid. It allows the elimination of dis-
tortions in the use of the concept of collective domi-
nance, which was creating uncertainty in the proce-
dure. The merger guidelines should also help reduce
uncertainty for parties contemplating a merger. The
changes introduce more checks and balances and pro-
vide an enhanced role for economic analysis. How-
ever, the Commission staff dedicated to economic
analysis is still quite limited in comparison to the US
antitrust agencies, and the imbalance of resources rel-
ative to the private sector is marked. Still, an open
question is whether the new checks and balances will
be enough to avoid the cases being overturned by the
CFI, which seems to have tightened the standards of
proof required from the Commission. Further rejec-
tions may imply that the system effectively changes to
one of judicial review more similar to the US.
In an inquisitorial procedure, the prosecutor/judge
may not look for all sides of the argument and seek
only reinforcing information. In the CFI decisions on
Airtours/First Choice, Tetra Laval/Sidel and Schnei-
der/Legrand, the Court criticised the Commission for
being one-sided and suppressing conflicting evidence.
When the prosecuting and judging functions are sep-
arated, the parties will generate information on all
sides of the argument. There is thus a case for a more
explicit adversarial procedure.
The introduction of a scrutiny panel has gone some
way, but it would make sense to go further and con-
sider an internal team that makes the pro-competitive
case for the merger.18 A further step would be to con-
sider the establishment of an administrative tribunal,
independent of the investigators, but still within the
Commission, that makes a public recommendation
on the merger to the College of Commissioners. The
Commissioners might still disagree with the panel’s
recommendation but would have to explain why. A
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16 Namely, Cournot markets with homogeneous products or
Bertrand markets with differentiated products and under some tech-
nical conditions on payoffs.
17 In fact, the group in charge of merger analysis – the Merger Task
Force – was dissolved as a separate unit and integrated into the
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further step would be for the administrative tribunal
to take the final decision. An even bolder step would
be to set up an independent European Competition
Agency similar to the US Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). At the FTC, the challenge to a merger is
brought to the decision of an administrative law judge
and the decision can be appealed to the full Commis-
sion; if the merging parties are not happy, they can
then go to a circuit court of appeals. In the European
case the parties could appeal the decision of the
European Competition Agency to the CFI and the
ECJ (the European Court of Justice).
6. Industrial policy and competition policy
Industrial policy often conflicts with competition pol-
icy. National governments may want to help declining
industries (like textile, coal, shipbuilding etc.) or
national champions such as Crédit Lyonnais, Bull, or
MG Rover. Examples abound with declining indus-
tries and national champions. This may reflect lobby-
ing efforts of local constituencies or a belief that some
sectors (like banking or energy) are strategic and need
well-entrenched domestic firms to defend the nation-
al interest. This conflicts with competition policy,
which limits state aids, and may slow the integration
of European markets.
6.1 Why ownership matters
Does the national ownership of firms matter? It
seems hard to argue that Belgium is worse off because
it has no national car producers. However, is the same
true of other industries like banking? Is a country
worse off if all its banks are foreign-owned? This is
close to happening in some developed countries like
New Zealand as well as some emerging markets
(including new entrants to the EU such as Estonia). 
The banking example
In the financing of domestic economic activity, and in
particular in relationship banking like lending to
small and medium-sized firms, proximity matters for
long-term commitments. Foreign ownership may
reduce the commitment of domestic banks to domes-
tic borrowers because distant headquarters may use
hard information and rigid protocols instead of soft
information and may have less tendency to internalise
the welfare of local stakeholders.19 In the US, this has
been a concern when large out-of-state banks took
over local institutions. 
However, as the Japanese experience has painfully
pointed out, close relationships may result in high
costs of finance (because banks cannot exit from
transactions), delay the closure of non-viable firms,
lead to collusive arrangements that prevent entry, and
eliminate healthy competition and innovation from
foreign institutions. All in all, in developed economies
with a well-diversified range of institutions, national
protectionism does not seem warranted even in bank-
ing. In emerging economies – as in Eastern Europe
where financial integration has been achieved mostly
through ownership by West European banks – the
alternative to foreign bank ownership may be semi-
public banks, vulnerable to political influence and
soft budget constraints.
Most mergers in the banking sector have been domes-
tic. There are obstacles to cross-border mergers in
Europe that do not affect cross-state mergers in the
US: more limited economies of international diversi-
fication, labour market rigidities as well as differences
in language, regulation, and corporate culture. Polit-
ical interference and the fostering of national champi-
ons are also prevalent. Recent examples of this in-
clude BBVA with first Unicredito and very recently
with BNL in Italy, and ABN Amro’s aquisition of
Antonveneta. The French authorities adopted a pro-
tectionist attitude in the triangular battle BNP-SG-
Paribas that ended up in the merger BNP-Paribas by
insisting on a “French” solution to the case.
Domestic mergers cut costs by reducing overlap in
branches (and overcoming labour market rigidities)
and many reap benefits from a financial conglomer-
ate. But such mergers may also increase or maintain
market power and prevent hostile takeovers. Cross-
border mergers may help to acquire local expertise,
access high-margin deposits or diversify, while size is
gained to compete in global markets. In fact, cross-
border regional mergers, where cultural and legal dif-
ferences are smaller, took place in late 1990s in the
Scandinavian and the Benelux countries. More re-
19 If a domestic firm borrows from a foreign bank, the lending bank’s
headquarters will be presumably located in another country. The
lending officers responsible for the loan will respond, directly or indi-
rectly, to headquarters located far away geographically and organi-
sationally. The foreign lending bank will presumably be a more com-
plex organization, which may be less able to offer the same services
and respond with the same flexibility as a local domestic bank. This
implies that large multinational banks, to ensure effective internal
controls, may be obliged to operate with internal procedures that are
quite standard across countries. Thus, large multinational banks
may not be flexible enough to adapt themselves to the specific needs
of local borrowers. Local banks, instead, are more able to respond to
the specific needs of local firms, and may be better partners in situ-
ations where relationship banking is important. An open issue is why
multinational banks do not develop internal organization structures
to cope with this problem. See Berglöf et al. (2005).cently, Banco Santander (Spain) was able to acquire
Abbey because the UK does not have a protectionist
attitude: the antitrust authority did block the
takeover of Abbey by Lloyds TSB in 2001 but not the
takeover by Banco Santander. Here a vigorous na-
tional competition policy promoted a cross-border
merger. Santander comes from an increasingly com-
petitive domestic market in Spain that has induced
efficiency gains and allowed international expansion
(mostly in Latin America). 
We have described how in the banking sector the loca-
tion of headquarters of banks may matter because
proximity is important for long-term credit relation-
ships. More generally, the location of headquarters of
a firm matters because headquarters create agglomer-
ation effects for both other headquarters and business
services. One example of such positive external effects
is the density of the market for highly qualified
labour. Most regions are therefore prepared to sub-
sidise the location of new headquarters (see Strauss-
Kahn and Vives 2005 for evidence on location factors
and external effects in the US.) Other advanced activ-
ities like R&D also tend to be located close to head-
quarters. 
Ownership also matters because proximity is relevant
for the protection of the interests of the different
stakeholders (such as workers, suppliers, small share-
holders and communities) in a firm. In bad times the
firm may tend to minimise staff cuts in its country of
origin. 
Large international firms typically develop a corpo-
rate culture with a national base and do need the sup-
port of a government, in terms of influence activities
and protection of property rights, to compete truly
internationally (for example, US “multinationals”
typically call on the State Department when in trou-
ble). This implies that companies remain “national”
for good reasons that may still be important in a glob-
alised world. 
In summary, ownership matters in so far as it influ-
ences the location of corporate control centres and
the associated externalities. Local and regional
authorities have incentives to retain and attract cor-
porate headquarters. There is a lot of path depen-
dence, that is, history matters, and there may be
potential multiple equilibria. This gives room for pol-
icy intervention. However, if all regions give subsidies
or protect their firms, they may neutralise each other
and imply both large budgetary costs and welfare
losses. Such protectionist attitudes may be self-de-
feating. 
6.2 From national to European champions?
Cross-border mergers may lead to the formation of
European champions. Competition concerns
should be less in such cases, because of the size of
the European market. But a trade-off may exist:
extracting rents from abroad against exploiting
European consumers. However, those champions
may be helped unduly to start with or, perhaps
worse, are too big to fail and are still provided with
subsidies when they should be closed down. In
some sectors where the learning curve is very steep
like aerospace, the commitment power that comes
with public help may prove crucial in international
competition. In this case, according to Neven and
Seabright (1995), help to Airbus basically entailed a
transfer of rents from US producers Boeing and
McDonnell-Douglas to Airbus, leaving the con-
sumers with small gains.
Cross-border mergers require the combination of very
different corporate cultures: to be successful in the
end, one culture has to predominate over the other.
Asymmetric mergers or absorption seem to work bet-
ter than mergers among equals. 
European competition policy regarding state aid may
be effective in checking support to national champi-
ons (as with Crédit Lyonnais) and serve as an external
commitment to not keep inefficient institutions in
business (see Besley and Seabright 1999). However, it
is not so clear that it can prevent the support of pan-
European champions: the Commission cannot easily
resist the simultaneous pressure of France and Ger-
many, as shown by the dilution of the Stability Pact
(see Box 1.4 in Chapter 1 of this report). Can the
independence of competition policy may be main-
tained given the politics of the Commission since
states can lobby Commissioners and other Director-
ates (like Industry or Energy) to further national poli-
cies? This tension between competition and industrial
policy has often surfaced, as in proposals to create a
Super Commissioner or Vice Presidency that would
oversee both industrial and competition policy, with
the obvious objective to keep competition policy in
check. Independent institutional bodies like an ad-
ministrative panel within the Commission or even an
own European Competition Agency might be ways of
protecting competition policy from these industrial
policy pressures.
EEAG Report 114
Chapter 5EEAG Report 115
Chapter 5
6.3 Privatisation and regulated sectors
Network industries such as electricity, gas, and tele-
coms have been liberalised and the incumbent
monopolies privatised in most countries (with the
conspicuous exception of France). In those industries,
regulation is maintained, even after liberalisation,
because they have some segments that are a natural
monopoly (for example, transmission and distribution
of electricity). The way the privatisation process has
been accomplished has very important consequences
for the level of competition and performance in the
industry. To privatise a monopoly is one thing: to
introduce a degree of competition and then privatise
is another. The evidence suggests that what really
matters for performance is the level of competition in
the industry (see, for example, Armstrong, Gowan
and Vickers 1994) rather than the structure of owner-
ship. However, in some instances the desire of govern-
ments to obtain cash from privatising a monopoly has
been a more important motive than to ensure compe-
tition. Some public companies have even been
allowed to merge before privatisation (this was the
case of the formation of the Spanish Endesa, for
example). 
In those network industries, it is important that a
potentially competitive structure is created before pri-
vatisation. Once firms with monopoly power are pri-
vatised it is very difficult to change the market struc-
ture with divestitures to enhance competition. Merger
proposals may offer an opportunity to rearrange
assets in a pro-competitive way. 
Network industries, such as those in the energy sector,
are typically considered strategic by many countries,
which resist privatisation or hold on to “golden
shares” even after privatisation. France has resisted
domestic liberalisation at the same time as publicly
controlled French firms have gone shopping in other
European markets.
7. Conclusions
Globalisation, accompanied by the information tech-
nology revolution and consequential lowering of
trade costs and market expansion, imposes restructur-
ing in many sectors and mergers are a prime instru-
ment. Size is necessary to compete globally in many
segments of industry and services, but consolidation
may pose a threat to competition. Competition is a
necessary prerequisite for economic efficiency: suffi-
cient competition is needed for innovation and the
timely termination of bad projects drives productivity
growth. Domestic competition is key to international
success and competitiveness: fostering national cham-
pions defeats this objective. The policy challenge is to
allow the needed restructuring and potential increase
in firm size in some sectors while at the same time pro-
tecting competition. 
Our first conclusion is that a vigorous competition
policy is needed, but care must be taken not to try to
enforce low concentration in natural oligopoly indus-
tries, where the dynamics of investment is such that
only a limited number of players can survive. Further-
more, merger control should take into account the
need for larger firm size in several industries and the
potential dynamic efficiencies, benefiting innovation,
generated by merger proposals. 
A second conclusion is that artificial obstacles to hos-
tile and cross-border mergers should be removed in
Europe. Hostile takeovers are a sign of health of the
market for corporate control. Cross-border mergers
should proceed without regulatory obstacles, as they
may keep in check the increase in domestic concen-
tration. We acknowledge that ownership is not neu-
tral, in particular in some industries like banking
where relationships are important, but on balance this
is insufficient justification for protectionism. Euro-
pean as well as national competition policy must play
a major role in keeping markets open.
A third conclusion is that care must be taken in not
promoting European champions that end up effec-
tively protected from closure. The political economy
of European champions may imply that the powers of
European competition policy, with the present institu-
tional structure, are very limited to deal with those
cases. Indeed, this is one instance where global coor-
dination of competition policies may help. 
Fourth, the 2004 reform of the merger control proce-
dure in the EU went a step in the right direction,
increasing checks and balances for merging parties
and the role of economic analysis. However, the guar-
antees for the parties, the quality of analysis and deci-
sion-making, and the protection against the lobbying
pressures of national governments and firms could
still be improved. Merger decision proposals should
be taken by an administrative panel, independent of
prosecutors and investigators. Failing this, a debate
should be opened about the need of an independent
European Competition Agency similar to the US
Federal Trade Commission.References
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